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COMMENT
TORT LIABILITY UNLEASHED: SOLESKY V. TRACEY AND
LANDLORD DUTY TO THIRD PARTIES
By: Errin K. Roby
I. INTRODUCTION

I

n Maryland, over 800,000 households own a dog. I Although data
indicating the exact percentage of renters who own dogs in Maryland
is not currently available, 2 issues surrounding dog ownership can
dramatically affect the overall quality of landlord/tenant relationships. A
key issue capturing public attention in Maryland is the high number of
recent severe dog attacks. 3 As a landlord, allowing pet ownership by
tenants creates possible tort liability for injuries. 4 A vital legal question is
involved when a tenant's pet injures a third party, such as a passerby,
should the landlord face tort liability for a tenant's pet that injures a third
party. In other words, how far does the landlord's duty extend?
A current news article highlights the naming of both the landlord of
the building and the tenant who owned the dog as co-defendants in a
three million dollar negligence suit stemming from a dog bite. 5 The boy
injured by the dog bite was not on the tenant's property at the time of the
attack. 6 Nevertheless, the complaint argues that the landlords are liable
for damages from the attack because they knew or should have known

I u.s. Pet Ownership Calculator, AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N,
http://www3.avma.org/reference/marketstats/ownership_ calculator.asp (last visited Nov. 18,
20 II). When using this calculator, the number entered in the "What is your community
population?" field was 5,773,552. This figure represents the population of the state of
Maryland in 2010. U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, State & County Quick/acts Maryland, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfdlstatesI24000.html(last revised Sept. 18,
2012,4:41 PM).
2 Telephone interview with Adam Skolnik, Executive Director, Maryland Multi-Housing
Ass'n, Inc. (Jan. 26, 2012).
3 See, e.g., Jonathan Bor, Biting the Hand that Feeds Them, BALT. SUN, Apr. 18, 1999, at lA,
available at 1999 WLNR 1128619 (highlighting the prevalence of dog bite injuries and
describing a nation-wide trend suggesting dog attacks have increased over time); Heather
Dewar, Infant's Death Stirs OffiCials to Reconsider Canine Laws, BALT. SUN, Aug. 12,2003,
at IB, available at 2003 WLNR 2045475 (describing the Baltimore City Council's response
to a fatal dog attack); Jean Marbella, Pit Bull Attack Upsets Neighborhood, BALT. SUN, June 8,
2011, at 2A, available at 2011 WLNR 11433201.
4 Andrea F. Siegel, Landlord Held Responsiblefor Dangerous Animal Kept by Tenant in
Apartment, BALT. SUN, Oct. 8, 1998, at 2B, available at 1998 WLNR 1104091.
5 Andy Marso, $3M Sought for Child Mauled by Pit Bull, DAILY REC. (BaIt., Md.), Sept. 29,
2011, at lA.
6 Id. at 6A.
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that the tenant was keeping a dangerous dog on the property, and that the
cage used to hold the dog was defective. 7 This argument for landlord
liability to a third party reflects the impact of the decision made by the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in Solesky v. Tracey.s
This comment will analyze how Solesky v. Tracey represents a new
development in Maryland law through its expansion of a landlord's duty.
Part I discusses" the background of a landlord's duty to third persons in
general and reviews Maryland's case law up to the instant case. Part II
explains how Solesky v. Tracey represents a new development in
Maryland law relating to a landlord's duty to a third person. Part III
proposes possible solutions focusing on how landlords could reduce their
vulnerability to negligence suits from third parties.

II.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

A. General Principles - Landlord's Liability for Third Person
Injuries
In general, a lessor is liable for physical harm to third parties outside
the leased property caused by the actions of the lessee if, but only if, the
lessor consented to the tenant's activity or knew that activity would occur
on the land. 9 The consent can be oral or implied by granting a lease with
full knowledge of the lessee's activity.lO Additionally, the lessor must
have known, or had reason to know, that the activity of the lessee would
involve unreasonable risk. II The requirement of consent is critical, as the
lessor is not liable for activities that occur without his consent. 12 If
consent is not obtained, the requirement of knowledge must be present in
order for the lessor to be liable for damages from the lessee's activityY
The issue of the lessor's consent or knowledge is emphasized when the
activities of the lessee could potentially cause a public or private
nuisance. 14 The scope of the lessor's liability based on knowledge is
narrow - the lessor is not required to protect against unpredictable
nuisance actions based on the careless behavior of the lessee on the leased
property.15 However, if the activity itself has an intrinsically harmful
nature that interferes with "the rights of the public," then the lessor's
7 Id.
s 198 Md. App. 292, 17 A.3d 718 (2011).
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 379A (1965).
10 Id. at cmt. h.
II RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 379A (1965).
12 Id. at cmt. c.

13

Id.

14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
15

Id. at cmt. i.

§ 837 (1965).
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consent or knowledge of the activity will leave him vulnerable to tort
liability. 16 The principles identified above apply with equal force to
landlord-tenant relationships.
A landlord is subject to the same consent and knowledge requirements
as a lessor, and these requirements are stated in nearly identical
language. 17 In addition to tort liability for activities involving
unreasonable risk, landlords also face liability if they know, or have
reason to know, that their tenants are not taking the necessary safety
precautions while participating in activities that could contribute to public
.
.
18
or pnvate nUIsance.
The safety issues surrounding the ownership of animals, including
dogs, are directly addressed through the concept of strict liability.19 As a
group, landlords are generally exempted from the strict liability standard
for an injury caused by tenants who own dogs. 2o Merely renting one's
property to a tenant owning a dog does not give the landlord the
knowledge of that dog's specific dangerous behavior that is required
under the strict liability standard. 21 When applied to incidents of third
party injury, a landlord's liability varies depending on how courts in a
specific jurisdiction apply general negligence concepts to the landlordtenant relationship.22 The next section will present a general multi-state
overview of landlord liability for physical injury to a third party.
B. Landlord's Duty to a Third Party - Multi-State Overview

Various jurisdictions support the general proposition outlined above:
landlords are not vicariously liable for injuries caused by tenants' dogs to
third parties. 23 When discussing the liability of landlords to third parties,
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 18.4 (1977) (stating that the
landlord is liable for physical harm to third parties by the actions of the tenant only if, the
landlord 1. consented to the activity of the tenant or knew it would occur, and 2. the landlord
knew or had reason to know that the activity of the tenant would involve unreasonable risk).
18 Id.
19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 23
(2010) (identifying strict liability as the negligence standard for physical harm caused by an
animal who exhibits abnormally "dangerous tendencies." The owner or possessor of that
animal must know, or have reason to know, of the animal's high risk of dangerous behavior).
20 Id. at cmt. f.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See, e.g., Boots ex. ref. Boots v. Winters, 179 P.3d 352,358-59 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008)
(holding that the landlord was not liable for injuries to a third party from a dog attack on the
premises); Bruce v. Durney, 534 S.E.2d 720, 725 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (enunciating a
statewide standard for South Carolina that a landlord is not liable for damages caused by a
tenant's pet to a third party); Gilbert v. Miller, 586 S.E.2d 861,865 (S.c. Ct. App. 2003)
16
17
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courts center their analysis on the question of the landlord's duty to the
third party.24 This is critical because without the existence of a legal
duty, the landlord cannot be held liable to the third party for damages. 25
Determining the duty of care owed by a landlord to a third party is
therefore dependent on how the facts of the individual case implicate the
existence of a legal duty under general negligence principles. 26
When analyzing a landlord's duty under general negligence principles,
some jurisdictions have moved away from the common law view that
landlords do not owe a legal duty to third parties.27 When assigning a
legal duty to a landlord for a third party injury, the landlord must know of
the animal's vicious behavior before liability arises. 28 The degree of
knowledge required is significant, as the landlord must possess actual
knowledge of the animal's vicious behavior. 29 In addition to actual
knowledge, the landlord must also have control over the rental premises
through leasing provisions or other regulations before a duty to a third
party will arise. 30 The argument for finding a legal duty attached to a
landlord may become stronger with a statutory basis for liability.31
In Uccello v. Laudenslayer, the court analyzed the text of Civil Code §
1714 and determined that the statute imposed the duty of ordinary care to
the landlord. 32 In a similar analysis, the Alaskan Supreme Court found
that a residential landlord company owed a duty of ordinary care to an
injured third party based on the landlord's failure to enforce its own
(reiterating the common law rule that "a landlord is not liable to a third party for injuries
caused by a tenant's dog").
24 See generally Boots, 179 P.3d at 356-59 (discussing the landlord's possible legal duty to
the injured third party under several theories, including premises liability, general duty to
exercise ordinary care, and assumption of duty by landlord. In each case, the court
determined that the landlord did not owe a legal duty to the injured third party).
25 See generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds.,
5th ed. 1984) (listing duty as the first required element of a negligence cause of action).
26 See Boots, 179 P.3d at 356-57 (discussing the general negligence principle of the duty to
exercise ordinary care).
27 See Batra v. Clark, 110 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003)(holding that a landlord
owed a duty of ordinary care to third parties who are injured by a tenant's animal if the
landlord had actual knowledge of the danger posed by the animal and if the landlord had the
ability to control the animal's presence on the property).
28 See Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 118 Cal. Rptr. 741, 747-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (advancing a
moral justification for landlord liability to a third party by holding that a landlord was liable
for failing to remove an animal from the premises if the landlord had actual knowledge of the
animal's vicious temperament).
29 Batra, 110 S.W.3d at 130.
30 Id.
31 Uccello, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 745 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1714 (West 2012) as the basis for
landlord liability. Civil Code 1714 states "every one is responsible, not only for the result of
his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or
skill in the management of his property or person.").
32 Uccello, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 746.
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written rules and regulations addressing dangerous pets. 33 Another
argument has been made that landlords might assume a duty to a third
party that did not previously exist by creating lease terms that specify the
size of dog that the tenant can keep.34

C. Landlord's Duty to a Third Party - Maryland Case Law
In Maryland, there is a trend moving away from the common law
theory shielding landlords from liability. The courts have found that
landlords may owe a legal duty for injuries sustained by a third party.35
In Shields v. Wagman and Matthews v. Amberwood Associates, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland analyzed the circumstances under which
landlords could owe a duty to a third party injured in an animal attack?6
Kimberley Shields and M. Bernard Johnson were both injured by a pit
bull named Trouble, who was kept by David Thomas, a tenant in the
commercial strip mall where the attacks occurred. 37 The lawsuit brought
by Shields and Johnson argued that the landlord of the commercial strip
mall, Joint Venture, was liable for their injuries. 38 The Circuit Court for
Prince George's County held that Joint Venture did not owe a duty to
Shields or Johnson, despite their status as invitees onto the leased
property. 39 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed that
holding. 4o The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the holdings of the
trial court and the Court of Special Appeals ofMaryland.41
Reversing both decisions, the Court of Appeals of Maryland devised
the criteria for determining when a commercial landlord has a duty to a
third party injured in the common area of the leased premises. 42
According to the court, one basis for tort liability may be found in the
relationship between the property owner and the third party.43 In general,
a property owner owes a duty of ordinary care to an invitee on the
Alaskan Vii!., Inc. v. Smalley, 720 P.2d 945, 948 (Alaska 1986).
Boots, 179 P.3d at 358.
35 See Shields v. Wagman, 350 Md. 666, 690-91, 714 A.2d 881, 892-93 (1998) (holding that a
landlord was liable for injuries sustained by a third party invitee to a commercial property);
Matthews v. Amberwood Assocs., 351 Md. 544, 570, 719 A.2d 119, 131-32 (1998) (holding
that the jury was justified in finding that the landlord of a residential property owed a duty of
reasonable care to a tenant's social guest).
36 Shields, 350 Md. at 668-69,714 A.2d at 882; Matthews, 351 Md. at 548, 719 A.2d at 120.
37 Shields, 350 Md. at 669-71,714 A.2d at 882-83.
38 Id. at 669-72,714 A.2d at 882-83.
39 Id. at 672, 714 A.2d at 883.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 672, 681, 714 A.2d at 883, 888.
43 Shields, 350 Md. at 673, 714 A.2d at 884.
33

34
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property, whereas a property owner does not owe such a duty to a
trespasser. 44 Normally, a tenant assumes a duty of ordinary care when
leasing property from a landlord, because the landlord has relinquished
control of the property to the tenant. 45 In considering the liability of the
landlord, rather than the tenant, the Shields court determined that because
Joint Venture maintained control of the common area where the injury
occurred and had reason to know of the danger posed by the tenant's pit
bull, it may have owed a duty of ordinary care to Shields and Johnson. 46
In Maryland, the twin elements of control and knowledge must both
be present for the landlord to owe a duty to third parties injured in
common areas. 47 The two elements are closely linked. For example, the
control element can be satisfied by demonstrating that the landlord knows
or has reason to know that there is a dangerous condition (i.e. a vicious
animal) in the common area managed by the landlord. 48 The control
element can also be independently established by considering the
landlord's control over the presence of the dangerous animal via a refusal
to renew the lease unless the dangerous animal is removed. 49 As for the
knowledge element, the landlord must possess specific knowledge of the
animal's dangerous behavior in order for a duty of ordinary care to
apply.5o The court stated that testimony regarding the actual knowledge
possessed by the landlord regarding Trouble's behavior was therefore
appropriate evidence that could have been presented to the jury for
consideration. 51 In determining that the landlord, Joint Venture, was
liable to Shields and Johnson for their injuries, the court expressly limited
its holding to injuries sustained by third parties in common areas. 52
Matthews v. Amberwood Associates added to Maryland's analysis of
third party injury by addressing the duty owed by a residential landlord to
a social guest who is injured by a tenant's dog inside the tenant's
apartment. 53 While visiting Shelly Morton, Shanita Matthews's son,
Tevin Williams, was injured by a pit bull named Rampage. 54 Rampage
was kept by Morton in her apartment, which was owned by Amberwood

Id. (citing Bramble v. Thompson, 264 Md. 518, 521-22, 287 A.2d 265, 267 (1972)).
Shields, 350 Md. at 673,714 A.2d at 884 (citing Marshall v. Price, 162 Md. 687, 689, 161
A. 172, 172 (1932)).
46 Shields, 350 Md. at 690,714 A.2d at 893.
47 Id. at 681, 714 A.2d at 888.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 682, 714 A.2d at 888; see infra note 138 for the statutory defmition of dangerous dog.
50 Shields, 350 Md. at 684, 714 A.2d at 890.
slId. at 688-89, 714 A.2d at 892.
52 Id. at 690, 714 A.2d at 893.
53 351 Md. at 548, 719 A.2d at 120.
54 Id. at 550, 719 A.2d at 121-22.
44

45
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Associates. 55 Tevin's injuries were fatal, and Matthews filed a lawsuit in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against Amberwood Associates
alleging negligence. 56 The jury found Amberwood Associates negligent
and awarded damages for the wrongful death count and the survival
action brought by Matthews. 57 Upon appeal, the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland reversed the judgment in favor of Matthews, and
held that Amberwood Associates did not owe a duty to Tevin, based on
his status as a social invitee of Morton. 58 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted Matthews's petition for a writ of certiorari in order to
determine whether Amberwood Associates owed a duty of ordinary care
towards Tevin. 59
In its analysis, the Matthews court reiterated the element of control
discussed in the Shields case. 60 Although the Shields case limited the
landlord's duty to injuries occurring in common areas under control of
the landlord, the Matthews court took a broader view by arguing that a
landlord's control could extend beyond the common areas and apply to
conditions inside a tenant's leased apartment. 61 The court supported this
wider view of the landlord's duty based on the language of the lease,
which had a clear "no pets" clause. 62 In this manner, the court argued
that Amberwood Associates retained control over the interior of Morton's
apartment by forbidding pets of any kind. 63 Acknowledging that the "no
pets" clause alone was not sufficient to impose a duty of ordinary care
upon Amberwood Associates, the court presented a balancing test to
determine whether a duty is owed by a landlord to the guest of a tenant. 64
In Matthews, the court also added another factor to the discussion of
imposing a duty onto to the landlord: the foreseeability of the harm
presented by the tenant's anima1. 65 The court determined that the harm
caused by Rampage was foreseeable, based on testimony of Rampage's
previous attacks. 66 By identifying pit bulls as "extremely dangerous," the
Id. at 548, 719 A.2dat 121.
Id. at 551, 719 A.2dat 122.
57 Id. at 552, 719 A.2d at 122.
58 Id. at 552, 719 A.2d at 123 (citing Amberwood v. Matthews, 155 Md. App. 510, 513, 694
A.2d 131,133 (1997)).
59 Matthews, 351 Md. at 552-53, 719 A.2d at 123.
60 Id. at 556,719 A.2d at 124-25.
61 Id. at 556, 719 A.2d at 125.
62 Id. at 558, 719 A.2d at 125.
63 Id. at 558, 719 A.2d at 125-26; see infra note 147 and accompanying text.
64 Matthews, 351 Md. at 565-66, 719 A.2d at 129 (the factors weighed by the court included
the tenant's control of the rental home, the public safety concerns of the tenant keeping a
dangerous animal, and the landlord's control and knowledge of the dangerous animal).
65 Id. at 560, 719 A.2d at 127.
66 Id. at 561, 719 A.2d at 127.
55

56
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court also considered the breed of dog a relevant factor in its discussion
of foreseeability.67 Following the precedent of Shields, the Matthews
court held that the jury was justified in finding that Amberwood
Associates owed a duty to Tevin as a social guest. 68
The dissenting opinion in Matthews directly addressed the duty
element as applied to the landlord, arguing that the landlord did not owe a
duty to Tevin because the landlord had no knowledge of Rampage's
temperament. 69 Without this specific knowledge, the landlord would be
held to a higher duty to social guests than the tenant who invited them,
which Maryland law does not support. 70 The Shields case is
distinguishable by its common area limitation, and a narrow view of the
control element is presented for the Matthews case. 7l Because the animal
attack occurred inside the tenant's apartment in Matthews, the dissent
argued that the landlord no longer had control over the area.72 The
dissent also rejected the majority's analysis that the "no pets" clause
imposed a duty onto the landlord to remove Rampage from the premises.
The dissent also argued that the tenant, by bringing Rampage into the
apartment, had the duty to protect the third party from any injury that
could occur. 73 In addition, the landlord could not control the removal of
Rampage by evicting his owner because the landlord had waived his right
of eviction by accepting rental payments after he discovered that
Rampage was in the apartment. 74 Throughout its analysis, the dissent
referred to the common law principles of landlord liability.75 The tension
between the majority's expanded view oflandlord duty and the traditional
view of landlord duty presented by the dissent provided an opportunity
for legal analysis.
The Matthews case signaled a trend towards increasing landlord
liability beyond the common area and a move away from the common
law principle of landlord immunity from injuries occurring in a private
area. 76 It also was the first time that the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held a landlord liable for injuries caused by a dangerous animal within the

Id. at 561-62,719 A.2d at 127.
Id. at 570, 719 A.2d at 131-32.
69 Id. at 588,719 A.2d at 140-41 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
70 Matthews, 351 Md. at 590, 719 A.2d at 14l.
71 Id. at 588, 719 A.2d at 140-4l.
72 !d. at 589, 719 A.2d at 14l.
73 Id. at 590-91, 719 A.2d at 141-42.
74 Id. at 608, 719 A.2d at 150.
75 Id. at 596, 719 A.2d at 144 (stating that because the landlord was not the owner or keeper
of Rampage, the landlord should not face liability for the third party's injury).
76 Wade B. Wilson, Recent Decisions, Landlord's Duty Extended to Protect Tenant's Guest
from Vicious Dogs Within the Leased Premises, 59 MD. L. REv. 1254, 1257, 1260 (2000).
67
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tenant's premises. 77 By using the "no pets" clause as the basis of landlord
liability, the Matthews court wandered too far from the provision's
central purpose, which was the prevention of property damage. 78
Additionally, the fact that Rampage's attack occurred inSide a closed
apartment, where the landlord had no knowledge of Rampage's behavior
towards invited guests weakened the foreseeability argument for landlord
liability. 79 In summary, the Matthews case left residential landlords
unable to protect themselves from negligence lawsuits through leasing
provisions. 80 The most recent case in Maryland to address landlord
liability to a third party, Solesky v. Tracey, dramatically increased the
landlord's vulnerability to negligence lawsuits.
III. ISSUE
The Solesky case represented a new development in Maryland tort law
by expanding the landlord's duty of ordinary care from persons invited
onto the premises to third parties unknown to the tenant or the landlord. 81
A pit bull injured Dominic Solesky in an alley adjacent to the rental
property where the dog's owners, Thomas C. O'Halloran and Erin Cesky,
lived. 82 Dominic Solesky's parents filed a negligence suit in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore County against the dog's owners as well as Dorothy
Tracey, the landlord of the rental property.83 At the close of the Soleskys'
case, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted the landlord's
motion for judgment and ruled that there was insufficient evidence that
Tracey knew of the pit bull's dangerous behavior or had control over the
rental premises. 84 The Soleskys appealed, and the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland evaluated the evid~nce presented during the trial to
determine if that evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury's
finding that the elements for negligence were satisfied in regards to
Tracey.85

77
78
79
80
81

82
83
84

85

Id. at 1266-67.
Id. at 1268.
!d. at 1272.
!d. at 1273.
Solesky, 198 Md. App. at 331, 17 A.3d at 741.
Id. at 295, 17 A.3d at 720.
Id. at 295-96, 17 A.3d at 720.
Id. at 296, 17 A.3d at 720.
Id. at 296-97, 17 A.3d at 720-21.
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A. Landlord's Duty to a Third Party - Required Elements
The Solesky court identified the duty element as the key issue in the
plaintiffs appeal, and consequently followed the precedent established in
Shields and Matthews by framing its analysis of landlord duty with the
elements of knowledge and control. 86 In addition, this court gave great
weight to the factor of foreseeability, as it is used to extend the landlord's
liability to a third person injured off the rental property.87 A landlord
would face possible liability for a dog attack beyond the rental property if
a jury determines that the dog's escape from the property was foreseeable
by the landlord. 88 The Solesky court further added to previous Maryland
case law by analyzing the sufficiency of evidence required to extend
landlord liability to a third party.89

B. Evidence Required to Support a Landlord's Duty to a Third
Party
Because the landlord motioned for judgment at the trial court, the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland explained that it was required to
consider all the evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party, which would be the Soleskys.90 Analyzing the
knowledge element, the court began by establishing Tracey's knowledge
of the pit bull living at the tenants' residence through written lease terms
along with direct trial testimony.91 Tracey fulfilled a prerequisite of the
knowledge element by testifying that she was aware that two pit bulls, a
male and female, were being kept on the rental property because she saw
them during her inspection of the premises. 92 However, there was no
direct evidence that Tracey knew that either pit bull kept on the rental
property presented a danger to anyone, as she did not witness any
aggressive behavior. 93 The court stated that direct evidence was not
required to prove Tracey's knowledge,94 and affirmed that circumstantial
evidence was sufficient to determine Tracey's level of knowledge

Id. at 310, i 7 A.3d at 728-29; see supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
Solesky, 198 Md. App. at 330, 17 A.3d at 741.
88 Id. at 329-30, 17 A.3d at 740-41 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 379A;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 18.4).
89 Solesky, 198 Md. App. at 318-19, 17 A.3d at 734.
90 Id. at 324, 17 A.3d at 737.
91 Id. at 317 -18, 17 A.3d at 733 (establishing that the lease terms created by Tracey
86

87

specifically allowed pit bulls to be kept on the rental property).
92 Id.
93
94

Id. at 318,17 A.3d at 734.
See infra Part IIl.e.
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regarding the danger posed by the two pit bulls. 95 The court also
referenced the Shields case as an example where circumstantial evidence
allowed the jury to rationally find that the landlord had knowledge of the
vicious behavior of the pit bull (Trouble) prior to the attack in the
common area. 96 Additional Maryland cases have also held that
circumstantial evidence relating to a dog owner's knowledge of that dog's
dangerous tendencies would allow a plaintiff to survive summary
judgment. 97 Finally, the court determined that the jury could use the
neighbors' observations of the male pit bull' s behavior to make a rational
inference regarding Tracey's knowledge. 98
The court addressed the control element briefly, holding that the jury
could consider the renewal of the lease by Tracey as an opportunity to
exert control over the presence of the pit bulls at the rental property.99
The evidence supporting the control element was direct, as it was based
on the lease renewal terms expressly written by the landlord. 100 The court
also found that the control element was established by the inaction of the
landlord - Tracey did not require the owners of the pit bulls to take
additional measures to keep the dogs safely on the property besides the
containment pen already in place. 101 By affirming the element of
knowledge through circumstantial evidence, and vacating the trial court's
motion of judgment in favor of Tracey, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland presented a new standard by which to judge the duty owed by a
landlord to a third party who is injured off the property.
The dissenting opinion in Solesky questioned the majority's holding by
making the distinction between circumstantial evidence and "legally
sufficient evidence of negligence. ,,102 In order for the latter standard to be
met, the court must verify that any inferences drawn from circumstantial
evidence are based on "reasonable probability, rather than speculation,
surmise, or conjecture.,,103 The dissent viewed the lack of any direct
evidence of any violent tendencies exhibited by either pit bull kept on the

So/esky, 198 Md. App. at 318-19, 17 A.3d at 734.
Id.
97 Id. at 321-23, 17 A.3d at 735-36 (citing Mazur v. Scavone, 37 Md. App. 695, 378 A.2d
1355 (1977); Moura v. Randall, 119 Md. App. 632, 705 A.2d 334 (1998)).
98 So/esky, 198 Md. App. at 325, 17 A.3d at 738.
99 Id. at 328-29, 17 A.3d at 740.
100 Id. at 328, 17 A.3d at 739 (describing the key tenns in the renewed lease, including the
provision that the tenants pay for whatever damage the dogs may cause while expressly
stating that the landlord would not be responsible for any damage caused by the dogs).
101 Id. at 328-29, 17 A.3d at 740.
102 Id. at 331,17 A.3d at 741 (Rubin, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
103 Id. at 332, 17 A.3d at 742 (quoting Ward v. Hartley, 168 Md. App. 209, 218,895 A.2d
1111, 1116 (2006)).
95
96
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property as fatal to the plaintiffs negligence claim against Tracey.104 In
addition, there was no direct evidence that Tracey knew of any prior
attacks or injuries caused by the male pit bull that attacked Dominic
Solesky.105 Without Tracey's specific knowledge of that pit bull's
dangerous behavior, a necessary element in establishing Tracey's duty to
Dominic Solesky was absent. 106
The testimony forming the basis of the jury's inference of Tracey's
assumed knowledge of the male dog's dangerous behavior was also
analyzed. 107 The neighbors observed both pit bulls in the containment
pen barking and jumping as they walked by the backyard of the rental
property, but such a response towards strangers is not enough to prove the
dogs' hostility. 108 In fact, it could be considered typical behavior by a
dog of any disposition. 109 Furthermore, the plaintiffs could not
demonstrate that Tracey knew that there was a possibility that the pit
bulls could escape from their confinement pen. IIO Reasoning that the
evidence of the landlord's knowledge was insufficient, the dissent argued
that the trial court's ruling in favor of Tracey should have been upheld. 111
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted both Tracey's petition for
appeal and Solesky's cross-petition in order to consider the issue of
liability. I 12 The court established a strict liability standard that would
prospectively apply to anyone who owns or harbors pit bulls involved in
an attack. 1I3 By doing so, the court placed pit bull attacks in a special
category by explicitly modifying the existing common law liability
standard. 114 The court further held that pit bulls are "inherently
dangerous.,,115 The impact of this holding is significant: a landlord will
now be held strictly liable for damages to a third party if a plaintiff can
prove that the landlord knew, or should have known, that the dog kept by
the tenant was a pit bul1. 116

Solesky, 198 Md. App. at 332-33, 17 A.3d at 742.
Id.
106 Id. at 333, 17 A.3d at 742 (citing Matthews v. Amberwood Assocs., 351 Md. 544, 570,
719 A.2d 119, 131-32 (1998)).
107 Solesky, 198 Md. App. at 334,17 A.3d at 743.
108 Id.
109 Id. (citing Plowman v. Pratt, 684 N.W.2d 28,32 (Neb. 2004)).
110 Solesky, 198 Md. App. at 335, 17 A.3d at 744 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
III Id. at 336, 17 A.3d at 744.
ll2 Tracey v. Solesky, No. 53 Sept. Tenn 2011, 2012 WL 3759036, at *3 (Md. Apr. 26, 2012)
(citing Tracey v. Solesky, 421 Md. 192,24 A.3d 1025 (2011)).
113 Tracey, 2012 WL 3759036, at *3
114 Id. at *4.
115 Id.
116 Id. at *12.
104

105
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The dissent in Tracey specifically addressed the possible repercussions
of the majority's change to the common law standard. ll7 In the dissent's
view, the majority has "transform[ed] a clear factual question into a legal
one."l\8 The majority's holding is the first time in Maryland that a theory
of strict liability has been based upon the breed of the animal that caused
the injury.119 The dissent further stated that, under the principle of stare
decisis, the facts of this case did not warrant a change to the existing
common law standard. 120
In ruling on Tracey's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland clarified that the strict liability standard announced in Tracey
applied only to pure breed pit bulls. 121 The court ordered that any
reference to cross-bred pit bulls be stricken from the Tracey opinion filed
on April 26, 2012.122
C. Support for Extension of Landlord's Duty beyond the Rental
Property

Viewing the Solesky case in a broader context, there are public policy
arguments that support holding landlords liable for damages caused by a
tenant's dog. 123 In addition, various jurisdictions have determined that a
landlord's duty to a third party can extend beyond the boundaries of the
leased property.124 The nature of the relationship between the landlord
and tenant has been considered one source of tort liability.125 When
considering the nature of a landlord's responsibility to a third party,
Id. at *13 (Greene, J., dissenting).
Id.
119 Tracey, 2012 WL 3759036, at *16 (Greene, J., dissenting).
120 Id.
121 Tracey v. Solesky, No. 53, Sept. Tenn 2011, 2012 WL 3568308, at *1 (Md. Aug. 21,
2012).
122 Id. at *3.
123 Ramona C. Rains, Comment, Clemmons v. Fidler: Is Man's Best Friend a Landlord's
Worst Enemy?, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 197,208-09 (1995) (presenting two conventional
arguments in favor of landlord liability: 1. landlords should not be able to avoid responsibility
for damages based on the timing of an attack, and 2. an outsider observer such as a landlord
may have a more objective view of the animal's behavior than the animal's owner).
124 See Champ-Dorian v. Lewis, 892 N.Y.S.2d 665,667 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (holding that
a landlord could be held liable for breaching a duty of care to passersby if it was foreseeable
that they would be injured by the tenant's dog); Park v. Hoffard, 847 P.2d 852,855 (Or. 1993)
(holding that a landlord may be liable to injuries caused off the rental property by the tenant's
dog if the landlord knew or had reason to know that the dog posed an unavoidable danger to
fersons off the property).
25 Park, 847 P.2d at 854 (arguing that the relationship between the landlord and tenant gives
the landlord a degree of control over the tenant's actions which supports the extension of tort
liability to the landlord).
II?
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evidence of foreseeability can extend the landlord's liability to injuries
occurring off the rental property. 126 As in Solesky, the elements of
knowledge and control are cited as prerequisites for the existence of the
landlord's legal duty to the third party. 127
D. Current Maryland Law Cannot Shield Landlords from Third
Party Negligence Suits
One issue in the Solesky case centered around the language in the lease
stating that the landlord disclaimed any responsibility for any damage
caused by the two pit bulls. 128 The presence of that clause directly
impacted the majority's analysis of the control element. 129 The dissent
gave no weight to the clause, characterizing it as a standard requirement
in a residential lease.130 Traditionally, landlords shield themselves from
liability caused by tenant's actions through indemnity clauses. 131 In
Maryland, indemnity clauses are generally allowed based on the freedom
to contract, which allows parties to construct agreements without
interference. 132 However, an exception to this general rule directly
applies to landlords. \33
In Eastern Ave. Corp. v. Hughes, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that an exculpatory clause shielding the landlord from injuries
sustained by a tenant in the common parking lot did not violate public
policy.134 In response to that case, the Maryland General Assembly
passed a statute that declared exculpatory clauses within landlord and
tenant contracts to be void and against public policy. 135 Therefore, any
lease provisions that serve to protect landlords from liability claims will

126 Id. at 855-56 (landlord's knowledge of a sign posted on the door of the rental property
warning of a dangerous dog could demonstrate that the attack off the rental premises by the
tenant's dog was foreseeable).
127 Id. at 853 (citing Park v. Hoffard, 826 P.2d 79 (Or. 1992)); Lewis, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
128 Solesky, 198 Md. App. at 328, 17 A.3d at 739.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 336, 17 A.3d at 743-44 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
131 See generally John D. Perovich, Annotation, Validity of Exculpatory Clause in Lease
Exempting Lessor from Liability, 49 A.L.R.3d 321 (1973).
I32 See Scott A. Conwell, Recent Decisions, Exculpatory Clause Requires Statement of
Specific Intent, 57 MD. L. REV. 706, 709 (1998).
133 Id. at 710 ("exculpatory clauses produced by grossly unequal bargaining power").
134 228 Md. 477, 479-80, 180 A.2d 486,488 (1962).
135 Conwell, supra note 132, at 711. See also MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-105 (West
2012) (stating "[i]fthe effect of any provision of a lease is to indemnify the landlord, hold the
landlord harmless, or preclude or exonerate the landlord from any liability to the tenant, or to
any other person, for any injury, loss, damage, or liability arising from any omission, fault,
negligence, or other misconduct of the landlord on or about the leased premises ... , the
provision is considered to be against public policy and void.").
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be held invalided. 136 Without written protections in the lease, landlords
must consider whether the current Maryland law regulating dog
ownership does enough to shift the burden of tort liability onto the
tenants.
Maryland law currently prohibits a dog owner from keeping a
dangerous dog unattended on his property unless the dog is securely kept
indoors or otherwise restrained. 137 A dangerous dog is defined as one
who has demonstrably bitten a person or has attacked a person or other
animal without provocation.138 Additionally, a dangerous dog may not
leave the owner's property without specified restraints, such as a
muzzle. 139 At the municipal level, one Maryland county bans the
ownership of pit bull dogS. 140 Another county expressly holds the owner
of a dog liable for any damages it causes to a person, with limited
exceptions. 141 Although these statutes place responsibility for the dog's
behavior onto the owners, they address criminal liability, rather than the
civil liability at issue in So/esky.142 In Maryland, criminal liability is
distinct from civil liability because criminal liability is characterized by
"a wanton or reckless disregard for human life.,,143 The legal standard
used to evaluate civil liability is completely different. 144 The current
absence of Maryland law addressing civil liability of the dog's owner
reveals a critical need to look at all methods that allow landlords to
reduce their vulnerability to lawsuits from third parties.
IV.

SOLUTION

A. Actions Landlords Can Take Today

When initially drafting a lease, a landlord could attempt to limit
liability by including a "no pets" clause that prohibits a tenant from
136 See Cornell v. Council of Unit Owners Hawaiian Vill. Condo., Inc., 983 F. Supp. 640,648
(D. Md. 1997) (citing Wolfv. Ford, 335 Md. 525,531,644 A.2d 522, 526 (1994)).
137 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-619(d)(1) (West 2002).
138 CRIM. LAW § 1O-619(a)(2).
139 CRIM. LAW § 1O-619(d)(2).
140 PRINCE GEORGE'S CNTY, MD., CODE § 3-185.01(a) (2007).
141 BALTIMORE CNTY, MD., CODE § 12-3-104 (2011) (clarifying that the dog owner is not
liable if the person hanned was committing a tort or was taunting the dog prior to the attack).
142 See CRIM. LAW § 10-619(t) (stating that a violation is classified as a misdemeanor);
PRINCE GEORGE'S CNTY, MD., CODE § 3-116.01(a) (highlighting criminal penalties for owning
a fit bull, including the possibility of imprisonment).
14 Ruffin v. State, 10 Md. App. 102, 106,268 A.2d 494,497 (1970) (quoting 65A C.l.S.
Negligence § 306, p. 1075).
144 Solesky, 198 Md. App. at 309-10,17 A.3d at 728.(identifying duty, breach, actual
damages, and causation as required elements of civil negligence).
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keeping a dog on the rental property.145 In Matthews, however, the
failure to enforce a "no pets" clause when the tenant was in clear
violation was a key factor in the court's determination that the landlord
did in fact owe a duty to the third party.146 More specifically, landlords
may choose to protect themselves via lease provisions that restrict the
size or number of pets. 147 Landlords could also insert a lease provision
allowing a right of inspection in order to ensure tenants comply with any
pet restrictions written into the lease. 148
Lease provisions relating to animals can also be drafted with a focus
on the landlord's benefit rather than the tenant's protection from harm. 149
For example, in Gilbert v. Miller, the court determined that the language
of the lease provision aimed at pet ownership by tenants was solely
designed to prevent property damage. 150 Because the intent of the
provision was to protect the landlord from pets damaging the landlord's
property or making the rented unit less habitable, the court held that the
plain language of the lease provision would not support the plaintiffs
argument in favor of imposing a legal duty onto the landlord that would
require the landlord to protect tenants and third parties from injuries
inflicted by tenants' pets. 151 In its analysis, the court also emphasized
that the leasing provision explicitly provided that control over the pet was
the responsibility of the tenant, not the landlord. 152 Landlords also have
the power to terminate a lease if the tenant does not fulfill its terms. 153
In its analysis of the control element, the Solesky court offered two
methods that landlords could use to reduce the likelihood of a negligence
lawsuit from a third party: 1) imposing conditions on a tenant's lease
renewal, and 2) refusing to re-Iet the premises to the tenant. 154 These
steps, however, rely upon the premise that the landlord is aware of the
danger posed by the dogs at the time of lease renewal or tenant
eviction. 155 In order to safeguard themselves from liability altogether,

145 Quinlan, Landlords Should Take Precautions to Limit Liability for Tenants' Dogs, 30
LANDLORD TENANT L. BULL. 1 (Jan. 2009), available at Westlaw 30 No.1 QNLNLTL 6.
146 See Matthews, 351 Md. at 558,719 A,2d at 125.
.
147 Angela S. Robinson, Pets & Community Housing, 40 MD. B.J. 28, (Sept.-Oct. 2007).
148 Id.
149 Gilbert v. Miller, 586 S.E.2d 861, 864-65 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003).
150 Id. at 864.
151 Id. ("It is clear the language of the lease did not intend to make Gilbert, either as a tenant
or guest, a third party beneficiary by imposing a duty in tort on the landlord to prevent a
tenant's dog from injuring another. The lease provision cannot be construed as being for the
frotection of other tenants or guests") (emphasis added).
52 Id. at 865.
153 See Park v. Hoffard, 847 P.2d 853, 855 (Or. 1993).
154 Solesky, 198 Md. App. at 327, 17 A,3d at 739.
155 See Park, 847 P.2d at 855.
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landlords may choose to simply stop leasing to pet owners as a group.156
Before taking that drastic step, other ideas must be considered and
evaluated.
B. N,ew Laws Addressing Dog Ownership and Liability Should be
Created
1. Statewide Regulations Outlawing Pit Bull Ownership
The Solesky dissent acknowledges the power of the Maryland General
Assembly to regulate or ban pit bulls statewide. 157 Forbidding the
ownership of pit bulls as a breed might be an efficient way to shift
responsibility for third party attacks from the landlord back to the tenant.
One Maryland county has already taken the step to ban pit bull
ownership, as noted above. 15S In the wake of the dog attack that resulted
in the Solesky case, a Baltimore County councilman proposed legislative
regulations requiring pit bulls to be muzzled in public and caged at
home. 159
Looking at jurisdictions outside Maryland, some courts have upheld
municipal breed specific bans regarding pit bull ownership.160 In Garcia
v. Village of Tijeras, the court listed aggression, viciousness, and
unpredictability as inherent dangerous qualities of pit bulls. 161 Previous
instances of property damage and personal injuries directly attributable to
pit bulls in that specific municipality were also used to justify the total
ban of the breed. 162 The regulation at issue in City of Toledo v. Tellings
was actually more permissive, as it allowed a resident to own one pit bull,
although it did not permit more than one pit bull in a household. 163 In
upholding the regulation, the court determined that the city had a
. legitimate interest in protecting its residents from the significant danger
posed by pit bulls. 164 Other jurisdictions consider a pit bull ban a
permissible exercise of the government's police power. 165 Although pit
Wilson, supra note 76, at 1273.
Solesky, 198 Md. App. at 336,17 A.3d at 744.
158 See PRINCE GEORGE'S CNTY, MD., CODE § 3-1 85.01 (a)(2007).
159 See Josh Mitchell, Proposal Takes Aim at Pit Bull Maulings but Balto. County Bill Meets
Criticism, BALT. SUN, Oct. 8,2007, at lA, available at 2007 WLNR 19703777.
160 Accord Garcia v. Village of Tijeras, 767 P.2d 355, 363 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding a
municipal ordinance banning pit bulls); City of Toledo v. Tellings, 871 N.E.2d 1152, 1159
(Ohio 2007) (declaring ban of pit bulls constitutional) .
161 767 P.2d at 359.
162 Id. at 360.
163 871 N.E.2d at 1154.
164 Id. at 1157.
165 See Holt v. City of Maumelle, 817 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Ark. 1991).
156

157

•
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bull regulations may survive judicial scrutiny, there are serious public
policy concerns that cannot be ignored.
The first problem is identifying which dogs would be the subjects of a
breed specific ban, as the term "pit bull" refers to more than one breed of
dog. 166 Without a uniform term to describe the breed of dog at issue, it
can be difficult to determine if a particular dog falls into the banned
category of ownership. 167 A broad pit bull ban will unnecessarily
penalize gentle pit bulls who have no history of violence, while
simultaneously failing to control aggressive dogs that fall outside the pit
bull breed. 168 Furthermore, the vicious behavior of an individual pit bull
is not definitively inherent to the breed, as many pit bulls are trained to be
aggressive and forced to participate in illegal dog fights. '69 Dog fighting
is a significant problem in Maryland, and pit bulls carry a strong stigma
from their association with that activity.l70 A statewide ban would only
contribute to that perception. 171
Even if the public image of pit bulls could be rehabilitated, the
economic cost of a statewide ban may be prohibitive. Enforcing a
statewide ban requires increasing the number of animal control
employees who can capture dogs that are owned in violation of the law,
as well as additional holding facilities for dogs whose breed is in
question.172 There could be an increased strain on judicial resources, as
owners may choose to appeal their individual dog's classification as a pit
bul1. 173 In 2001, the Baltimore City Council rejected a proposed pit bull
ban, determining that the associated economic costs of the ban would

166 Safia Gray Hussain, Note, Attacking the Dog-Bite Epidemic: Why Breed-Specific
Legislation Won't Solve the Dangerous-Dog Dilemma, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 2847, 2851
(2006) (explaining that the general tenn pit bull can refer to the American Staffordshire
Terrier, the Staffordshire Bull Terrier, and/or the American Pit Bull Terrier); see also Kristen
E. Swann, Note, Irrationality Unleashed: The Pitfalls o/Breed-Specific Legislation, 78
UMKC L. REv. 839, 840 (2010).
167 Id. at 2852.
168 Id. at 2863-64.
169 Karyn Grey. Note and Comment, Breed-Specific Legislation Revisited: Canine Racism or
the Answer to Florida's Dog Control Problems?, 27 NOVA. L. REv. 415,437 (2003); see also
Amy Argetsinger, Many are Fighting Mad at Pit Bull Proposal, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1998,
at MOl, available at 1998 WLNR 8127226 (highlighting the link between dog fighting in
Annapolis, Maryland and a proposed city-wide pit bull ban).
170 See Arthur Hirsch, Abused Pit Bulls Face a Difficult Transition, BALT. SUN, Dec. 10,
2011, at lA, available at 2011 WLNR 25671424.
171 See Breed-Specific Legislation, AM. SOC'Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS,
http://www.aspca.orglfight-animal-cruelty/advocacy-center/animal-laws-about-theissues/breed-specific-legislation.aspx (last visited Jan. 14,2012).
172 Hussain, supra note 166, at 2871.
173 Id.
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exceed the funds allocated to the Baltimore Bureau of Animal Control. 174
Although a pit bull ban in Prince George's County, Maryland currently
remains in force, a 2003 task force recommended repealing the county
wide pit bull ban, citing the high cost of enforcement relative to the ban's
effectiveness. 175 Overall, the task force deemed the ban inefficient, as the
high administrative costs involved in decreasing the number of pit bulls
in the county could not produce a quantifiable benefit in terms of public
safety. 176 With the economic constraints and enforcement issues
identified above at the municipal level, the obstacles facing a statewide
ban may be too great.
Most importantly, even if a statewide pit bull ban were put into place,
there is no guarantee that its subsequent enforcement would protect
landlords from negligence lawsuits from third parties. Even if a landlord
could prove that a tenant kept a pit bull in violation of the statute, this fact
standing alone would not be sufficient to shift liability completely to the
tenant. 177 The fact that a dog is a pit bull is not acceptable evidence that
the dog is dangerous. 178 Accordingly, mere ownership of a pit bull is not
sufficient to impose tort liability onto a dog owner - additional evidence
demonstrating that pit bull's specific dangerous behavior is required. 179
Rather than banning ownership of a single breed, different legislative
reform is needed.
2. Maryland Statute Defining Scope ofLandlord Tort Liability

Landlord vulnerability to third party negligence suits could be reduced
by codifying the common law principle that landlords are not responsible
for the actions of the tenant on the leased property. I 80 Some states adhere
to the rule that at the moment the landlord transfers possession to the
tenant via a lease, he is not responsible for any subsequent dangerous
Allison Klein & M. Dion Thompson, City Council Rejects Ban on Breeds ofAttack Dog,
SUN, May 15,2001, at lA, available at 2001 WLNR 1035250.
175 Hussain, supra note 166, at 2872 (comparing the fees collected from pit bull registrations
over two years ($38,000) against the costs incurred by the Animal Control Division in
enforcing the ban over the same time period ($560,000)); see also Punish the Deed, Not the
Breed: Task Force Reportfrom Prince George [sic) County Maryland ... [sic], UNDERSTANDA-BULL, http://www.understand-a-bull.comlBSLlResearchIPGCMDIPGCMTOCI.htm. 6 (last
visited Jan. 15,2012) [hereinafter Task Force Report].
176 Task Force Report, supra note 175, at 10.
177 See Rivers v. Hagner Mgmt. Corp., 182 Md. App. 632, 654, 959 A.2d 110, 123 (2007)
(describing the Maryland standard treating the violation of a statute as evidence of negligence,
rather than negligence per se).
178 Ward v. Hartley, 168 Md. App. 209,220 n.7, 895 A.2d 1111, 1117 (2006).
179 Id.
180 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 18.4 (1977).
174
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conditions brought onto the property by the tenant. 181 When applied to
animals brought onto the premises by a tenant, this division of liability is
strongly supported by the fact that the landlord is not the owner or keeper
of the animal. 182 Another justification is derived from the theory that
because the tenant enjoys the benefit and use of the animal, he should
bear the costs of any damage caused by the animal. 183 In this way, the
landlord would not be forced to insure against the potential bad acts of
the tenant. 184
In light of the Solesky court's extension of the duty element, a new
statute may be necessary to reduce the number of negligence suits
brought by third parties against landlords. The Maryland General
Assembly could model a new statute after a current Georgia law
providing that "[h]aving fully parted with possession and the right of
possession, the landlord is not responsible to third persons for damages
resulting from ... negligence ... by the tenant.,,185 As applied, the
Georgia statute has been interpreted to limit the liability of landlords to
third parties who are injured by tenants' animals. 186 Passing a statute
with similar language would not be a completely novel step, as the Court
of Appeals of Maryland previously determined that a landlord was not
liable to a third party based on the rationale that the landlord has parted
with control and therefore was not responsible for the nuisance created by
the tenant's animal. 187
C. Existing Maryland Rules Regarding Opinion Testimony Should
be Applied to Cases like Solesky

The Maryland Rules of Evidence were designed to assist the court
system in determining the truth during trial. I88 In applying these rules, a
critical distinction is made between lay testimony and expert

181 See Gibbons v. Chavez, 770 P.2d 377, 380 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (quoting PROSSER &
KEETON ON TORTS § 63 at 434 (5th. ed., 1984)); Stokes v. Lyddy, 815 A.2d 263, 271 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2003).
18 Rains, supra note 123, at 206; see also Fernandez v. Marks, 642 P.2d 542, 543 (Haw. Ct.
AfP.1982).
18 Rains, supra note 123, at 207.
184 Rains, supra note 123 at 206-07; see also Stokes, 815 A.2d at 277 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003)
(arguing against a rule of landlord liability that would place landlords in the position of
becoming the "insurers of the general public.").
185 GA.CODEANN.§44-7-14(1982).
186 See Webb v. Danforth, 505 S.E.2d 860, 861 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); Ranwez v. Roberts, 601
S.E.2d 449, 451 (Ga. Ct. App 2004).
187 Ward v. Hartley, 168 Md. App. 209, 216, 895 A.2d 1111, 1115 (2006) (quoting Marshall
v. Price, 162 Md. 687, 689,161 A. 172, 172 (1932)).
188 MD. RULE 5-102 (West 2011).
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testimony.189 Maryland Rule 5-701 permits opinion testimony from lay
witnesses to be admitted at trial if that opinion is "rationally based on the
perception of the witness, and helpful to ... the determination of a fact in
issue." 190 Maryland Rule 5-702 states "[ e]xpert testimony may be
admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the court determines
that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue.,,191 The trial court has an obligation to
carefully scrutinize the legitimacy of any expert witness. 192 Before expert
testimony will be admitted, the scientific foundation underlying the
testimony must be verified as reliable. 193 Questions regarding the
admissibility of expert testimony often arise in criminal cases. 194
However, in Schultz v. Bank ofAmerica, Maryland Rule 5-702 governing
expert testimony was applied to a negligence case. 195
Ordinarily, expert testimony is not required when the alleged act of
negligence is so apparent that the trier of fact can understand the
applicable standard of care without the aid of expert testimony.l96 In
Solesky, the dissent specifically referred to this rule when questioning the
legal sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence presented by the plaintiff,
and advocated a more stringent standard. 197 Because a required element
for landlord liability is demonstrating the landlord's knowledge of the
specific dog's dangerous behavior, expert testimony should be used when
a plaintiff cannot produce direct evidence of the landlord's knowledge.
Other jurisdictions have considered expert testimony in negligence
cases in which evaluating the disposition and behavior of the dog in
question is necessary to determine the validity of a claim or defense. 198
In Sinclair v. Okata, the defendants were sued under a strict liability
189 See Alan D. Hornstein, The New Maryland Rules a/Evidence: Survey, Analysis, and
Critique, 54 MD. L. REv. 1032, 1062-63 (1995).
190 MD. RULE 5-701 (West 2011).
191 MD. RULE 5-702 (West 2011).
192 See Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575,591,971 A.2d 235,245 (2009) (affinning the trial
court's function as a gatekeeper regarding the admissibility of expert testimony).
193 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phannaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993)
(establishing the trial court's duty to ensure that scientific testimony admitted into evidence
meets the heightened standard of reliability derived from the scientific method); Reed v. State,
283 Md. 374, 380-81, 391 A.2d 364, 367-68 (1978); Blackwell, 408 Md. at 585, 971 A.2d at
241.
194 See generally Gutierrez v. State, 423 Md. 476, 32 A.3d 2 (2011); Morton v. State, 200 Md.
AfP. 529,28 A.3d 98 (2011).
19 413 Md. 15,28,990 A.2d 1078, 1086 (2010) (holding that expert testimony is generally
required to establish the standard of care owed to a layperson by a professional).
196 Id. at 29, 990 A.2d at 1086-87.
197 Salesky, 198 Md. App. at 334, 17 A.3d at 743 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
198 See Sinclair v. Okata, 874 F. Supp. 1051 (D. Alaska 1994); Henning v. City of Fort
Wayne, No. 1:08-CV-00180, 2009 WL 2905482 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 8,2009).
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theory of negligence relating to an incident where their dog, Anchor,
injured a young boy.'99 In order to prevail under their strict liability
claim, the plaintiffs were required to prove that Anchor's behavior was
"abnormally dangerous. ,,200 The defendants were able to successfully
challenge that element by offering expert testimony that characterized
Anchor's behavior as "natural.,,201 In Henning v. City of Fort Wayne,
expert testimony was used to evaluate the conduct of a dog named Misty
who was shot by police officers during an investigation of the Henning's
residence. 202 Henning brought suit against the police officers alleging the
shooting of Misty constituted a violation of his Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable seizure of property.203 The officers argued that
Misty's aggressive behavior left no choice but to use extreme force, and
presented expert testimony in support of that argument. 204 The court
determined that the witness testifying to Misty's behavior was qualified
as an expert in dog behavior and training. 205 Furthermore, the admissible
testimony related to territorial aggression would enable the trier of fact to
understand facts or issues raised by the defense. 206 An examination of
Moura v. Randall will uncover similar principles at work in the Maryland
court system. 207
In Moura, the parents of a child injured by an unleashed dog named
Diesel brought suit against the dog's owner based on strict liability and
negligence theories. 208 In the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, the
defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that there were no
genuine issues of material fact. 209 In the affidavit supporting his motion,
the defendant stated that he had never observed any aggressive behavior
by Diesel towards people prior to the date of the attack. 2lO In response,
the plaintiffs submitted a copy of the expert testimony given by Mark
Lipsitt, a dog trainer who personally evaluated Diesel after the attack, and
determined he was dangerous. 211 The trial court ultimately granted the
motion for summary judgment. 212
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Reviewing the plaintiffs appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland analyzed the admissibility and scope of Lipsitt's expert
testimony in the context of the plaintiffs negligence claim.213 The
appellate court determined that a trier of fact would be permitted to use
Lipsitt's testimony as a basis to draw a permissible inference concerning
Diesel's behavior at the time of the attack. 214 Perhaps even more crucial,
the expert testimony could also apply to the question whether Diesel's
owner knew of his dog's dangerous behavior. 215 This holding has
important implications for the future of landlord liability after the Solesky
decision.
One strong argument against the use of expert testimony in negligence
cases such as those similar to Solesky involves the subject matter at issue
- dog behavior. Expert testimony is not admitted into evidence if the
jury is able to understand and analyze the facts of the case without the
assistance of expert testimony. 216 Additionally, the court will also
exclude expert testimony if the subject matter falls into the category of
common knowledge. 217 Expert testimony may still have a role in dog bite
cases, as Maryland courts have been very explicit that general knowledge
that a dog belongs to a certain breed cannot form an adequate basis for
judging the behavior of an individual dog. 218 Despite that holding,
landlords may not be completely protected by scientific witnesses who
can offer testimony that is based on general principles of animal behavior
outside the facts of a particular case.219 This is due to an important
limitation of expert testimony - the trial judge has the discretion to
admit such testimony in whole or in part. 220 In order to compensate for
possible gaps in expert testimony, opinion testimony offered by lay
witnesses under Maryland Rule 5-701 should also be examined to
determine whether a plaintiff has adequately demonstrated the elements
of knowledge and control necessary to create a legal duty.
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Under Maryland Rule 5-701, a lay witness's opinions or inferences are
admissible only if grounded in first-hand knowledge. 221 Applying this
standard to landlord liability, a plaintiff bringing a negligence action
could use this type of testimony to establish the degree of danger posed
by the dog causing the injury.222 In Slack v. Villari, the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland reversed a judgment holding the Slacks liable for
injuries sustained by the Villaris during their interaction with the Slacks'
dog, a Doberman pincher named Gideon.223 As the Villaris were passing
in front of the Slacks' driveway, Gideon ran toward them and began
growling. 224 Mrs. Villari suffered personal injuries trying to avoid
Gideon. 225 Under a negligence theory of liability, the Slacks were
charged with failing to control their dog as required by the county
ordinance. 226 Mrs. Slack testified that she issued a verbal command when
she saw Gideon walk away from her, and he returned immediately.227.
She was not aware of Gideon's encounter with the Villaris. 228 The court
determined that there could not be a statutory violation as there was no
proof of negligent behavior by Mrs. Slack. 229 The court stated that Mrs.
Slack had exercised reasonable care in controlling the dog throughout the
incident, and therefore she was not liable to the Villaris under a
negligence theory. 230
In evaluating the Villaris' strict liability claim against the Slacks, the
court turned its attention to the behavior exhibited by Gideon. 231 In order
for the Slacks to be liable under this theory, the evidence must
demonstrate that they knew or should have known that Gideon would be
likely to growl and charge towards the Villaris as they walked by the
Slacks' house. 232 A neighbor testified that Gideon had not caused any
previous problems in the neighborhood. 233 The Slacks' direct testimony
indicated that Gideon had a calm disposition and had never bitten
anyone. 234 Based on this record of past behavior, the court determined
221 See MD. RULE 5-701 (West 2011); see also Goren v. U. S. Fire Ins. Co., 113 Md. App.
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that Gideon's aggressive reaction to the Villaris was unexpected, and the
Slacks could not have reasonably known or predicted that he would
behave in that manner.235 Without this knowledge element, the Slacks
could not be held liable under a strict liability theory.236
As demonstrated in Slack, the specific behavior of the dog that caused
the injury was a vital component in the court's analysis of the dog
owner's potential liability. Because a landlord does not have the same
interaction with the dog as the owner would, the testimony required to
establish the level of danger posed by a specific dog should be gathered
from multiple sources. 237 Gathering evidence of the dog's temperament
is especially critical since landlord liability may extend beyond the
bounds of the rental property if the dog poses an unavoidable risk of
harm. 238 When applied to landlord liability cases, the rules governing
opinion testimony from both expert witnesses and lay witnesses can
ensure that the duty element is met.
V.

CONCLUSION

Landlords have many responsibilities to their tenants. When a tenant's
dog injures a third party, the role of the landlord is not immediately clear.
At common law, landlords were not responsible for the damage caused by
the animals brought onto the premises by a tenant. As Maryland case law
progressed from Shields v. Wagman to Solesky v. Tracey, the pendulum'
has swung too far in the opposite direction. In the wake of Solesky,
landlords may have a legal duty to third parties injured off the rental
property. More importantly, this duty can now be established by a
plaintiff without direct evidence of the landlord's knowledge or control
over the tenant's pet. In order to counteract this expansion of the
landlord's duty, legislative reform is necessary. A breed-specific ban
targeting pit bulls is one option, but there are legitimate concerns about
the ban's scope and effectiveness that must be addressed. Legislation
clearly stating that landlords are not responsible to third parties for the
negligent acts of tenants may effectively protect landlords from
negligence lawsuits in the future, but current landlords still face liability.
Today, the best protection for landlords is found in the Maryland
Rules of Evidence that regulate the admissibility of both expert testimony
Slack, 59 Md. App. at 477, 476 A.2d at 234.
Id. at 477, 467 A.2d at 234-35.
237 See Solesky, 198 Md. App. at 336, 17 A.3d at 744(Rubin, J., dissenting) (identifying police
officers and animal control officers as potential witnesses that could testify to the dog's
behavior post-attack).
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and lay witness testimony. Consistent application of these rules is
required to make sure that a landlord will only be held liable for
negligence in situations when his knowledge and control of the tenant's
pet is sufficient to create a legal duty to a third party who is injured by
that animal.
By carefully scrutinizing the burden of proof necessary to establish the
elements of knowledge and control in negligence lawsuits, the Maryland
court system can ensure that only the party truly responsible for an injury
to a third party will bear the legal and financial costs of a trial judgment.

